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【ABSTRACT】I happen to believe that although human experiences are to 
be characterized as pluralistic, they are all rooted in one reality. I would 
assume the thesis of pluralism but how could I maintain my belief in realism? 
There are various discussions in favor of realism but they appear to stay 
within a particular paradigm and so to be called ‘internal realism.’ In this 
paper, I try to justify my belief in reality by discussing a special use of 
indexicals. I argue for my indexical realism by advancing the thesis that 
indexicals can be used as an inter-agentic referential term. Three arguments 
for the thesis are presented. The first argument derives from a revision of 
Kaplan-Kvart’s notion of exportation. The notions of exportation of singular 
terms can be analyzed as intra-agentic exportation in the context of a single 
speaker. This may be revised to be an inter-agentic exportation in the context 
of two speakers who use the same indexicals. The second argument is from 
the notion of causation, which is specifically characterized in the context of 
inter-theoretic reference. I argue that any two theories may each say “this” in 
order to refer to what is beyond its own theory. Two theories may address 
themselves to “this” same thing although what “this” represents in each theory 
can turn out to be different objects all together. The third argument is based 
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on a possibility of natural reference. Reference is used to be taken mostly as a 
3-place predicate: Abe refers an object oi with an expression ej. The traditional 
notion of reference has been constructive and anthropocentric. However, I 
argue that natural reference is a reference that we humans come to recognize 
among denumerably many objects in natural states: at moment mi in a natural 
state, there is a referential relation among objects o1, o2, o3, …, oj, oj+1, … 
which interact with each other as agents of information processors. Natural 
reference is an original reference, which is given independently of a human 
language and to which humans are passive as they derivatively refer to it by 
using “this.”
Ⅰ. Indexicals: A Foundation for Realism
An utterance of the sentence “I am here now” is like a human footprint 
in that both entail the existence of an agent―the speaker of the remark 
and the maker of the footprint. This article pursues this suggestive 
analogy in an attempt to develop a stable theory of realism, one that is 
based upon certain features of indexical expressions. The discussion that 
follows is motivated by the realization that the assumption of pluralism, 
which is essential for the co-existence of human kinds, requires a stable 
theory of realism and that perhaps the three most common versions of 
realism may not suffice for this purpose. Thus, a new theory of realism is 
needed. While pluralism and realism may at first glance appear to be 
incompatible,1) in what follows I argue that they are indeed consistent; in 
1) I would start with a sort of working definitions of pluralism, realism and indexical 
realism. Pluralism is a belief that there are two or more systems of true 
interpretations of the world, realism is a belief that there are things independent of a 
human language which make sentences to be true, and indexical realism is a belief 
that indexicals like “this” have certain roles to play in connecting plural systems and 
reality. The traditional dichotomy of realism and idealism may be due to a failure to 
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particular, I show that indexical-based realism does not violate the 
presuppositions of pluralism.
At a general level, realist theories can be divided into three types: 
common sense realism, internal realism and radical realism. Common 
sense realism generally manifests itself as a critical response to relativism 
or postmodernism. One well-known approach to common sense realism 
was taken by D. Davidson,2) who held that truth is primitive; contrary to 
what relativists claim, Davidson insisted that truth is what is presupposed 
whenever people make assertions. Common sense realists typically 
believe that pluralism does not, whereas relativism does, presuppose a 
primitive notion of truth. An explanation is needed of whether, and if so 
how, these two views can be reconciled. One possible explanation may 
hinge on the idea that every speaker presupposes some notion of truth, 
but this truth need not be the primitive truth of metaphysical realism. 
Another version of realism worth considering is Putnam’s internal 
realism.3) Like Kantian epistemology, this version of realism depends on 
the distinction between a thing-in-itself and a concept-dependent object. 
Putnam advanced this notion of realism along with a notion of truth that 
is concept-dependent. He abandoned the notion of metaphysical realism 
appreciate the roles that indexicals play in human languages. One type of realism, 
exemplified in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ notion of scala naturae, presupposes an 
ontological hierarchy, supposing that purer a form is more real it is; and traditional 
idealism, which may be traced to the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume, provides 
justifications for pluralism in actual social experiences, regarding that indexicals are 
just relative as any cognitive ideas are. Neglect for the role of indexicals may be due 
to the long-standing presupposition in philosophy that ordinary language is inferior 
to “the” formal language.
2) Davidson, D. (1990: 279-328; 1984: 65-76). 
3) Putnam, H. (1981: 22-48; 1988: 22-32; 1990: 30-42; 1980: 464-482). Putnam in his 
later period advanced semantical externalism in his discussion of the twin-earth 
thought-experiment, which may be understood as a move toward scientific realism. 
This version, though more persuasive than other versions, still does not discuss how 
inter-agentic references can be related.
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and along with it any notion of truth that is transcendent or 
non-epistemic, such as the correspondence theory of truth. Putnam 
accepted that truth is epistemic and that reference is not transparent but 
rather internalistic in the sense that communal forms of life are 
constructed out of an “empirical influx.” However, it is far from clear 
how this empirical influx makes his internalism genuinely realistic. 
Further explanation is needed.
A third version of realism can be found in Davidson’s theory of radical 
interpretation.4) According to Davidson, it is possible, given the principle 
of charity, for the speakers of one language to correctly interpret the 
sentences uttered by speakers of a radically different language. 
Furthermore, Davidson held that the possibility of radical interpretation 
does not require any notion of direct reference or external truth. 
However, the process of radical interpretation relies too much on the 
individual capacities of the interpreter and provides an unsatisfactory 
basis for drawing realist conclusions. 
If there is a solid justification for realism, it should be found in 
something other than Davidson’s notion of primitive truth, Putnam’s 
empirical influx, or the theory of radical interpretation. The argument for 
realism that I put forward in this paper is based on a particular 
understanding of indexicals, that is, expressions such as “I/you,” 
“here/there,” “today/yesterday,” and other terms whose referents are 
context-sensitive. Some philosophers regard expressions of tense (e.g. 
“is”), modality (e.g. “possible”), gradual adjectives (e.g. “fast”), and even 
folk-psychological verbs (e.g. “realizing”, “intending”, “knowing”)5) as 
indexicals, at least when they are understood contextually. According to 
Kaplan, the linguistic meaning (i.e. character) of indexicals is 
4) Davidson, D. (1984: 125-140; 1990: 279-328).
5) Perry, J. (1979: 723-734); Babb, M. (2016: 439-457); Schaffer, J. (2004: 73-76).
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conventional while their reference or referential meaning (i.e. content) is 
contextual; Kaplan also proposed that the contexts of indexiclas are 
constituted by agent, time, location and possible worlds.6) Thus, Kaplan 
thought that any sentence S is true in the context C or in the world of C, 
where the predicate “being true in the world of C” is more basic than the 
predicate “being true in the context of C” since the latter is regulated by 
the former. In what follows I accept that indexicals are ordinarily 
understood in accordance with Kaplan’s semantics, but I explore the 
possibility that in certain exceptional cases indexical expressions can be 
used independently of any notion of possible worlds.
My strategy is to pay close attention to the way in which indexical 
expressions like “this” refer. While “this” is typically used in ordinary 
language to refer to an object, indexical realism looks beyond Kaplan’s 
intra-contexts to consider how the term functions in inter-contexts.7) In 
other words, the direct referentiality of “this” can be generalized as 
inter-agentic referentiality. I will argue below that the inter-agentic 
referentiality of “this” covers both inter-speaker and inter-theoretic 
referentiality and, furthermore, that inter-agentic referentiality applies 
also to the information processors that are found in the natural world. 
These arguments will be used to justify the position of indexical realism.8) 
6) Kaplan, D. (1985; 1979: 401-412); Braun, D. (2015; 2008: 57-99).
7) Schaffer, J. (2004: 82-86) makes a distinction between indexicality, which is 
constructed by semantical rules, and ternicity, which is generated by the absence of 
clear devices. He takes contextualism to treat ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes 
different epistemic properties in different contexts and contrastivism to treat 
‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will 
argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, 
by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood 
by contrastivist theory. But he seems to deny the possibility that an indexical can be 
used independently of an established language. 
8) Sun-Hie Kim (2013: 276-278) takes the thesis of my conception of inter-agentic 
reference (i) to presuppose that two theories are incommensurable, not sharing any 
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Ⅱ. Inter-Personal Co-Referentiality
My first argument for indexical realism is based on Kaplan and 
Kvart’s notion of the exportation of singular terms. Writing in response 
to Quine’s question, sometimes called “Frege’s Puzzle”, concerning the 
logic of propositional attitudes,9) Kaplan and Kvart claimed that different 
singular terms can refer to the same object in the context of a single 
speaker. By way of illustration, consider the following sentences:
(1) Ralph believes “the man in the brown hat is a spy.”
(2) Ralph believes “the man seen at the beach is not a spy.” 
(3) The man in the brown hat = the man seen at the beach = Ortcutt.
(4) Ralph believes “Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy.”
(5) Ralph believes “the man in the brown hat is a spy and the man seen 
at the beach is not a spy.”
(6) Is Ralph rational or not rational?
Quine believed that (1), (2), and (3) together imply (4) and that 
(4) entails that Ralph is irrational, which is counter-intuitive. The 
problem, in Quine’s view, is the failure of the rule of the substitutivity of 
identicals in the context of propositional attitudes. However, according to 
Kaplan and Kvart, the problem consists in the inference from (1), (2), 
and (3) to (4); they insist that what is entailed by (1), (2), and (3) is not 
(4) but rather (5), which does not conflict with the supposition that Ralph 
is rational. Kaplan and Kvart’s argument is based on the idea that (3) is 
object or any property, and (ii) to imply that the co-referentiality thesis allows two 
theories to be commensurable. And she questions whether the presupposition and 
the implication are compatible. 
9) Quine, W. (1971: 101-111); Kaplan, D. (1971: 112-144); Kvart, I. (1982: 295-328). 
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true on its de re reading but false on its de dicto reading. Since Ralph’s 
beliefs―those expressed by (1) and (2)―are de dicto one cannot use the 
de re reading of (3) to infer (4). The rule of the substitutivity of identicals 
implied by (3) applies only in de re contexts. In order to provide a de 
dicto interpretation of (3), Kapalan and Kvart introduce the notion of a 
vivid reference predicate, “predicate R (that a singular expression e 
denotes an object oi vividly in the case of the speaker a),” which is 
formalized as follows:10) 
(K1) R (e, o, a) iff e represents o vividly to a; that is, iff
(i) e denotes o, 
(ii) e is a name of o for a, and
(iii) e is sufficiently vivid. 
One can rewrite (1) and (2) in accordance with (K1) by using the 
following notation [B = believe; S = being a spy; H = a man in the brown 
hat; ιxHx=the man in the brown hat (the x: Hx); B = a man seen at the 
beach; ιxBx=the man seen in the beach (the x: Bx); o1 = Ortcutt; r = 
Ralph].
(1a) (∃x) (R (ιxHx, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph B “x is a spy”);
(2b) (∃y) (R (ιxBy, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph B “y is not a spy”);
Then, given (1a) and (2b), together with the de dicto reading of (3), 
one can infer (5a) or, formally, (5b).
(5a) (∃x) (∃y) (R (ιxHx, Ortcutt, Ralph) and R(ιxBy, Ortcutt, Ralph) 
and Ralph B “ιxHx is a spy and ιxBy is not a spy”).
10) Kvart, I. (1982: 305-307); Kaplan, D. (1971: 134-138).
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(5b) (∃x) (∃y) (((R(ιxHx, ο1, r) ∧ R(ιxBy, ο1, r)) ∧ Β(r, “Sx and ˥Sy”))
Finally, (5b) allows the transparent structure in (7), which shows that 
Ralph can maintain consistency and rationality in the context in which he 
apparently holds incompatible beliefs about the same person (e.g. 
Ortcutt). 
(7) (∃x) (∃y) (((R(ιxHx, ο1, r) ∧ R(ιxBy, ο1, r)) ∧ Β(r, “Sx and ˥
Sy”)) ∧ (ιxHx = ιxBy= ο1)).
Kaplan-Kvart’s notion of vivid reference predicate R can be revised to 
support indexical realism; thus, two speakers, while using “this” to refer 
the same thing, can say about different objectst. In other words, it is 
possible to transform the vivid reference predicate R into the vivid 
demonstrative predicate D, that is, “predicate D (that a demonstrative 
‘this’ refers an object oi vividly in the case of the speaker a”). In ordinary 
language, “this” typically exhibits direct referentiality, which carries with 
it a concrete space-time context. The fact that a speaker a utters “this” to 
refer an object oi means that a has a vivid representation at space-time t 
when a utters “this”. I now introduce the following predicate, D, modeled 
on Kaplan and Kvart’s predicate R:
(K2) D (this, o, a, t) iff “this” represents o vividly to a at t; that is, iff
(i) “this” denotes o at t,
(ii) “this” is a name of o for a at t, and
(iii) “this” is sufficiently vivid at t.
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The question to ask at this point is how if at all this vivid 
demonstrative predicate D is relevant to indexical realism. To see how it 
is, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Mary and Nancy adopt 
different paradigms and yet they pay attention to what is the shared 
interest of a scientific community to which they both belong. And they 
use the demonstrative “this” to refer to that shared interest. This scenario 
can be represented as in (8) using the following notation: [∃this = for 
some token utterance of “this”;11) m = Marry; n = Nancy; g=the thing of 
the shared interest of a scientific community at a certain time period; 
thism = “this” uttered by Mary at ti; thisn = “this” uttered by Nancy at tj; Ui = 
being understood in language Li ]. 
(8) (∃this)(D (this, g, m, t) ∧ D (this, g, n, t) ∧ (Uithism ∧ ˥  Uithisn ∧ 
Ujthisn))
Mary’s “this” and Nancy’s “this” have the same demonstrative 
character but represent different uses or contents. The two cases of “this” 
behave as rigid demonstratives, possibly referring to the same thing, that 
is, a shared interest of the scientific community to which they both 
belong. This grammar can be expressed as follows: 
(9) (∃this) (((D (this, g, m, t) ∧ D (this, g, n, t)) ∧ (Uithism ∧ ˥ 
Uithisn ∧ Ujthisn)) ∧ (this = g)) 
This sentence captures the idea that Mary and Nancy can use the same 
word “this” to refer to the same thing while having different 
understandings of the thing in question. In other words, different 
11) “∃this” can be rephrased as “(∃x) (this) x m t (for some x, x is an event of 
utterance of “this” by an agent m at time t)”.
Daihyun Chung12
speakers are able to speak differently about the same thing.12)
The plausibility of the vivid demonstrative predicate D can be seen by 
reconsidering Quine’s notion of reference. For Quine, reference is both 
inscrutable and relative. It is inscrutable in that referential relations 
cannot be determined uniquely by states of affairs; it is relative in that 
referential relations are chosen relative to a translation manual.13) 
Davidson, on the other hand, rejected the idea that reference is relative, 
claiming that the natural way of stating a rule to the effect that 
“expression x refers to object y relative to a translation manual” is to say 
simply that the translation manual translates x into y. Davidson drew a 
distinction between the ontology and the epistemology of reference and 
thereby accepted the inscrutability of reference while denying its 
relativity. Quine tried but failed to introduce the relativity of reference 
into a speaker’s language, for no discussion can take place unless the 
relativity of reference is already solved.14) These debates concerning the 
understanding of reference are plausible only if one ignores the issue of 
indexical reference.
The direct referentiality of “this” shows the limitations of the 
Quine-Davidson debates over reference. To see this one need only 
consider the notion of an object, which is one of the four places for the 
demonstrative predicate. Sentence (8) indicates how Mary and Nancy 
12) One may ask what is the same thing referred to by “this” used by two competing 
theories. This question sounds natural since there seems no candidate for a sortal 
concept readily available to combine the two cases in the competing theories. But 
from my perspective, it is empirical investigations which will answer to the question 
whether what the competing theories talk about by using “this” are the same or not.
13) Quine, W. V. O. (1960: 26-30, 72-79). Quine’s two propositions may lead him to 
embrace a form of semantic eliminativism, but his notion of stimulus meaning 
allows him to entertain a sort of dispositional reductionism (Kai-Yuan Cheng 2008). 
Yet, both of Quine’s meaning skepticism and his notion of stimulus meaning points 
to the idea of naturalizing of meaning.
14) Davidson, D. (1984: 229-239). 
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speak of the object oi within their respective languages Li and Lj, both 
uttering “this” at time t to refer it. Though the two objects which are 
grasped and understood in two different languages may not be the same, 
those two objects are traceable, in principle, to something which is not 
yet involved with any conceptual or linguistic networks. It is something 
which is free of Kaplanian possible worlds, which is to be directly 
referred to only by “this”, and which is to be given only as a thing rather 
than an object. When different scientific communities under different 
paradigms come to recognize a shared interest it may be rigidly 
designated by “this” and dubbed “g.” For example, if what is called 
“water” is H2O in the actual world it is H2O in every possible world; here 
“it” refers rigidly to that same thing. What (8) and (9) show is that it is 
possible to maintain the special function of the direct referentiality of 
“this” even if one accepts Quine’s or Davidson’s understanding of 
reference. Two speakers may use “this” to say differently about two 
different objects in their own languages, and yet their different 
explanations may be about the same thing.
Ⅲ. Inter-Theoretic Co-Referentiality
The second argument for indexical realism is based on the idea of 
inter-theoretic co-referentiality, that is, the idea that two different 
theories can refer to a thing outside of each theory using “this”. Two 
theories on the surface seem to construct two different objects from what 
they call “this” within intra-theoretic space. But on a deeper analysis 
these “two different objects” are traceable to the same source.15) It will 
15) One case of tracing to the same source can be constructed as follows. In my view, 
Newton’s ‘lightn’ and Einstein’s ‘lighte’ are causally connected to their utterances of 
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be helpful at this point to see how intra-theoretic reference is related to 
inter-theoretic reference.
In the previous section I accepted the distinction between the ordinary 
linguistic meaning (i.e. character) of “this” and its context-dependent 
referent (i.e. content), and I assumed that the selection of the referent is 
determined solely by a speaker’s intentions. Jaegwon Kim has made an 
important observation about this assumption.16) Kim’s reservation about 
the notion of reference concerns the causal relation between the event of 
the initial naming and that of the derivative naming, but his question is 
ultimately focused on the relation between the act of naming and the 
object thereby named. How does the act of naming reach the object 
thereby named? In other words, how are an act and an object connected? 
The first candidate to connect them is a description which selects a 
referent. However, Kim believes that a descriptive phrase does not 
“this,” and their relevant singular terms can be identified with what was referred to 
by their utterances of “this”. Jinho Kang (2013:272-274) has observed that what is 
required of the causal connection is theory-dependent, and Hwan Sunwoo (2013: 
284-287) has suggested that things which can be identified are not guaranteed to be 
identical. Both Kang and Sunwoo have concluded that the notion of co-referentiality 
that I tried to reach by the means of “this” is not available. Their observations are 
relevant as far as their traditional frames are allowed to be reasonable. But I claim 
that a distinction between theory-dependent object and theory-independent thing can 
be made and that “this” can be used to refer not only intra-causal events which we 
can talk about within scientists’s frames, but also to refer trans-causal events which 
we cannot talk about but which we can only point to as thisness.
16) Kim, Jaegwon (1977: 606-620). However, Kim may be taken as a sort of indexical 
realist. For the notion of indexicals need not be limited to particular linguistic 
expressions. The notion may be expressed by an indicator, which was suggested by 
Kim (1996: 191-193) and Stalnaker (1984: 18). Many people may share the same 
belief that it is now raining here. For there is a correlation in a normal condition 
between the situation that it is now raining here and the perception that it is now 
raining here. If the correlation obtains then the perception is said to be the indicator 
of the situation that it is now raining here. Since Kaplan’s notion of indexical 
consists of two elements, linguistic meaning (character) and referential meaning 
(content), Kim’s notion of indicator appears to satisfy these two conditions.
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determine the selection of a referent; rather, he thinks that the description 
which helps to select the referent presupposes the speaker’s cognitive 
contact with the referent. This cognitive contact is some sort of direct 
cognition or Russelian acquaintance. Furthermore, Kim believes that the 
Kripkean causal theory of reference is exposed to the difficulties 
associated with Russel’s idea of acquaintance. 
Kim’s concern about the relation between the act of naming and the 
object named is justified when one maintains a sharp epistemological 
distinction between subject and object. However, this distinction, which 
was central to the tradition that stretches from Descartes to Hume, was 
first weakened by Kant’s Copernican turn and later called into question 
again by epistemology of quantum mechanics. According to Jung Won 
Lee,17) whereas measurement in classical mechanics is a copying process 
that shows the value of physical quantities on the assumption that 
physical quantities really exist in physical objects and correspond to 
physical properties, quantum mechanics involves a completely different 
notion of measurement. In quantum mechanics measurement is not a 
mirroring act that copies what is there physically; rather, measurement 
has two aspects, one of which consists of an epistemic mode in the sense 
that some physical stimulus allows some empirically meaningful proper 
value, the other of which is a physical mode in the sense that physical 
objects carry proper states to correspond to empirical effects. The 
coexistence of epistemic and physical states gives rise to a distinction 
between measurement information and state information. Measurement 
information exhibits an empirical representation, which is significant at 
the moment the observer obtains a measurement but which has nothing to 
do with any future events or their causal involvements. State information, 
on the other hand, is informative of the causal relations by which one can 
17) Lee, Jung Won (2009: 1-23; 2002: 287-290).
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predict the result of the measurement. This information is given 
empirical meaning only through some special semantic rules, which give 
rise to theory-dependent object descriptions. State information has a 
one-to-one correspondence with measurement information only at the 
moment of measurement. Thus, these two different kinds of information 
are heterogeneous.
The distinction between state information and measurement 
information in the epistemology of quantum mechanics has significant 
implications for the role of the demonstrative “this” in intra- and 
inter-theoretic reference. “This” may be used to reflect both types of 
reference at the same time even when used in different theories. The 
demonstrative’s intra-theoretic referentiality is a descriptive referentiality 
in which state information is given some empirical meaning in accordance 
with relevant semantic rules. But the demonstrative’s inter-theoretic 
referentiality is a referentiality of measurement information, which the 
speakers obtain in their contact with the thing at the moment of 
measurement. Intra-referentiality may vary at different times of 
measurement, but it is stable due to the constancy of a theory, whereas 
inter-referentiality, though restrained by the condition that measurement 
is relevant only at the moment, is real referentiality that mirrors state 
information in the sense that measurement information and state 
information have a one-to-one correspondence.18) 
18) The distinction between intra-theoretic referentiality and inter-theoretic referentialiy 
may be clarified through the contrast between haecceity and haecceitism. If 
haecceity is a term to denote some discrete properties of an object that make it a 
particular thing then the haecceity would be an object’s thisness, whereas if 
haecceitism is a term to denote the numerical distinctness of two possible worlds 
which are indistinguishable from each other then the haecceitism provides a 
candidate for the criterion for transworld-identity. It may be plausible to take the 
following understanding that haecceity is an essentialist interpretation of this to see 
its thisness in the intra-theoretic context whereas haecceitism is an empirical 
investigation of whether two possible worlds are only numerically distinct (Son 
Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 17
While quantum mechanics challenges the epistemological distinction 
between subject and object, it remains to be seen how the dissolution of 
this dichotomy is realizable in the relation of state information and 
measurement information by using “this” as an inter-agentic reference. 
Toward this end, Putnam’s discussion of indexicality and rigid 
designation will be helpful.19) Putnam tried to clarify the Kripkean notion 
of rigid designation by indexicality. Suppose, for instance that W1 and 
W2 are possible worlds which are indistinguishable except what are clled 
“water” in the two worlds is H2 O in W1 and XYZ in W2 and that a glass 
in W1 is filled with H2O and a glass in W2 is filled with XYZ. Two 
speakers, one in each world, each point to their respective glasse, and 
make the following utterance: 
(10) This is water.
Putnam thinks that there are two possible theories for explaining the 
meaning of “water” in the utterance (10). Suppose W1 is the actual world. 
Then the first theory is that “water” is extensionally relative to worlds but 
is intensionally independent of worlds. The second theory is that “water” 
means different things in the two worlds, that what is called “water” in 
W2 is really not water, and that water is H2O in every possible world. 
Thus, the demonstrative “this” is interpreted differently in the foregoing 
two theories. “This” is understood in its de dicto sense in the first theory 
but in its de re sense in the second. Putnam takes the second 
interpretation to be the proper one. The two theories can be summarized 
as follows: 
2003; Choi 2008; Dorato 2013).
19) Putnam, H. (1970: 102-118; 1973: 119-132; 1977: 423-442; 1978b: 97-119).
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(T1) (W)(x in W)(x is water ↔ x bears same L to the entity referred to 
as “this” in W); 
(T2) (W)(x in W)(x is water ↔ x bears same L to the entity referred to 
as “this” in the actual world W1).
The “same L” relation stands for a trans-world relation between two 
terms. Their extension is the set of ordered pairs of individuals which 
may not exist in the same possible world. For example, if a is 5m tall in 
W1 and b is 5m tall in W2, {<a, b>} belongs to the extension for the 
predicate “being of the same height.” Likewise, “being of the same 
liquid” or “being not of the same liquid” may have a trans-world relation. 
{< H2O, XYZ>} belongs to the extension for the predicate “not being of 
the same liquid.” Appealing to this notion of trans-world indexicality, 
Putnam defined rigidity as follows: an expression “e” is rigid if and only 
if the object which is so called in the world W1+n has the same L relation 
with the object which is called “e” in the actual world W1.20)
Putnam’s strategy of obtaining rigidity by means of “this” is 
interesting in that “this” may play a similar role in alleviating ambiguity 
and vagueness since “this” can refer to either state or measurement 
information. Without Putnam’s strategy, it is difficult to know whether 
“this” should be understood in its de re or de dicto sense in reference to 
that information. But with his analysis, it is easy to see how “this” can be 
20) Putnam and I share a realistic view of the world by appealing to the notion of 
indexicality as shown in Putnam’s view of the twin earth thought experiment and 
my notion of reference. But Putnam does not go in to the detailed discussion as to 
how the notion of de re indexicality could get out of the Kaplanian possible world 
structure. In other words, Putnam explains how the demonstrative “this” can hold 
the same L relation of reference of the actual world W1 to the reference of another 
possible worldn+1. But his explanation takes place within a Kaplanian intra-possible 
worlds. He did not pay attention to a possible notion of trans-possible world 
reference relation.
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understood in its de re sense. For the “same L” can be understood, not 
relative to worlds, but rather based on the actual world W1. However, 
Putnam’s position is incomplete since though the referentiality of state 
information is stabilized through Putnam’s de re interpretation of “this”, 
the referentiality of measurement information remains in darkness. 
Though the referentiality of state information can clearly maintain its 
intra-theoretic referentiality, there seems no way to show how the 
inter-theoretic referentiality would be plalusible in the case of 
measurement information. 
One candidate to explore for the challenge may be accessible from 
Jung Won Lee’s notion of pluralistic reality. This can be characterized as 
follows: (i) if measurements about what is denoted by “this” or 
“something” result in the same consequences under the same 
circumstances then the identity of the denotation can be empirically 
confirmed; (ii) as for the value of “this” if one can predict through a 
theory that the probability of the value is 1 then what is denoted by “this” 
is not discontinued but temporally sustainable; (iii) if the measurement of 
the denotation of “this” (property A) of a thing does not have any 
influence on the information of the denotation of “that” (property B) of 
the thing then what are denoted by “this” and “that” are independent. 
Given that constancy, sustainability, and independence are neither logical 
nor a priori, these are conditions for pluralistic realism.21)
It seems that Jaegwon Kim’s question about the relation between the 
naming act and the object named has been partially but not completely 
answered. To provide a complete answer it is necessary to take into 
21) The three conditions for Lee’s pluralistic reality can be read in the context of 
epistemology of classical mechanics. But here they need to be taken to entertain the 
idea of how some different momentary pluralistic measurements could be 
empirically correlated with each other in the context of the Seoul Interpretaion of 
quantum mechanics.
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account how “this” is used causally in context. The aforementioned 
distinction between an object oi and a thing gj can be rephrased as 
follows: what is connected with other elements within a system by the 
utterance of “this” becomes an object oi (state information), but what is 
not connected thus but just touched by an utterance of “this” is a thing gj 
(measurement information). The distinction enables one to see more 
clearly the two dimensions of the causal context of “this”. There are two 
routes leading to causality in the context of an utterance of “this.” The 
linguistic route is a causal chain which starts from an utterance of “this” 
and ends with the object oi within the theory; the ontic route is a causal 
chain which starts from an utterance of “this” and ends with the thing gj 
outside of the theory. The linguistic route of causality is one in which 
different theories arrive at objects of different understanding with a 
notion of rigidity that is relevant to their own linguistic formulations. But 
the ontic route of causality reaches what is the same endpoint despite the 
different uses of “this” by various theories.
Ⅳ. Natural Reference
The third argument for indexical realism is based on the notion of 
natural reference.22) In this section I will explicate the notion of natural 
22) My thesis of natural reference may look “highly stretched” but it may be 
strengthened by considerations of semantics of natural languages. Procedural 
semantics by Johnson-Laird (1977), Cognition as Categorization by Harnad (2005), 
Semantics of Natural Selection by Jeongmin Lee (2017) and Reference Naturalized 
by Chung (2016b) may be taken to show such a direction. Meaning of a word does 
not have to presuppose notions like intentionality or mental image but is fully 
located at the role-place which the word occupies in the meaning space of its 
system, natural or artificial. Any spatio-temporal marks exhibited in Whalesongs, 
warning sounds of birds, bees’ waggle dance are bound to have the role-place in 
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reference and show how indexicals play an instrumental role in it. 
Traditionally, reference is understood as a three-place predicate, Rabc, as 
in “a speaker ai refers to an object bj by an expression ck”. A speaker is 
the subject of a referring act, an object is the target, and an expression is 
a part of a given language or something added to the language.
The distinction between the traditional reference and natural reference 
can be understood in terms of the relation between an object and a thing: 
an object is concept-dependent whereas a thing is theory- independent. 
Prior philosophical discussions that establish the concept-dependency of 
objects include Kant’s transcendental arguments, Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of language games, and Goodman’s exposition of the ways of 
world making.23) Perhaps the best example of arguments for the concept 
dependency of objects may come from Kaplan, who constructed the 
notion of context relative to possible worlds. For him, a referential object 
(i.e. the content) of an indexical expression is a language-dependent or 
possible world-dependent object. However, a thing exists independently 
of the linguistic constraints that any conception presupposes. Kaplan 
interprets indexicals in terms of contexts defined by possible worlds, but 
on this interpretation there is no way in which indexicals can connect to 
things outside of Kaplanian possible worlds, yet it should in principle be 
possible to connect them. If traditional reference is intra-theoretic, there 
should also be a trans-theoretic reference by means of indexicals to refer 
to those things outside of Kaplanian possible worlds. This is how the 
notion of natural reference should be understood.
To illustrate the foregoing consider how “this” can refer to an 
inter-theoretic thing. Of course, “this” is capable of referring to whatever 
their respective life systems. They don’t require any notion of intentionality in order 
to have a meaning. 
23) Kant, I. (1987, 1781/1787), Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Goodman, N. (1978).
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a speaker wants to talk about, an object or a thing. Some notions of 
causality may help to shed light on the distinction between an object and 
a thing. The theoretical immanence of an object is part of the structure on 
which the linear theory of causality is based. The linear theory analyzes 
the notion of causation in terms of the following bi-conditional:24) “ci is a 
cause of cj if and only if ci is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for cj but a necessary part of a sufficient condition for cj”. The 
events that enter into linear causal relations must be intra-theoretic 
events, otherwise it would be impossible to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the alleged causation. Though such events are 
passive, as all Cartesian material things are, they obtain conceptuality 
through Kantian epistemological constructions in order to become 
theoretically inter-connected and eventually part of a sufficient condition 
for causation within a theory.
The linear theory of causation offers no explanation as to how passive 
material events can engage in active causal relations. Such causal 
relations can be described as mechanistic, but the key question is how 
this sort of causation is powered and structured. A plausible answer to 
this question can be found in the notion of yinyang, where things in 
nature are viewed as active subjects that process information. Yinyang 
permits and demands the active agency from things in nature and 
requires those things to exhibit natural referentiality unlike passive 
objects that possess only concept-dependent referentiality.25) But what 
exactly is this natural reference? Just as mechanistic reference is 
dependent on the metaphysics of the Cartesian tradition, natural reference 
may be taken to be based on the naturalism of yinyang, which comes 
from a different philosophical tradition.26)
24) Mackie, J. L. (1975).
25) Chung, D. (2014; 2013; 2008a).
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Yinyang naturalism is an ontology in which trans-theoretic things exist 
and complement each other with the properties of yin and yang. In the 
order of yinyang, things in nature consist of dispositions, properties, and 
events, all of which are trans-theoretic beings. Such things are active 
processors of information and intentional subjects that preserve their own 
identity, existing among other subjects. Therefore, a thing in nature at a 
particular moment simultaneously plays the dual roles, (i) as a subject 
that refers to others and at the same time (ii) as an object that is referred 
to by others. Inter-connections of natural reference are thus given in such 
a yinyang order. Humans approach this order of natural reference 
linguistically with an understanding of natural reference that is 
interpretative and hermeneutical. Natural reference is not an a priori 
reference reflecting an established language but rather an executive 
reference exhibiting how nature really works. To understand how natural 
reference is trans-theoretic, one must distinguish between two notions of 
natural reference, namely, that of state information and that of property 
essentiality. Given this, let us now see how “this” can function 
derivatively as a natural referring term. 
The first type of natural reference is that of state information in which 
different things are mutually referential as active processors of 
information. State information is local and causal. There are many ways 
in which things, as parts of an organic system, communicate with each 
other, one of which relates to the hypothesis that causal relations are a 
natural kind.27) Natural kinds are exemplified in things like tigers and 
spinach and also in material substances like water and gold. One 
understands how they behave through scientific inquiry. Scientists 
construct theories to understand and explain concrete cases of natural 
26) Chung, D. (2016a; 2008c).
27) Chung, D. (2014: 10).
Daihyun Chung24
kinds. But when they refer to these natural kinds, the act of referring is 
an act of interpreting what they are presented with; it is hermeneutical 
rather than constitutive of the natural kind. For example, chemists 
construct theories about molecular formulas within one or another 
conceptual framework, but what they observe in concrete cases is types 
of material molecules or the number of atoms within the molecule. When 
chemists say “water is H2O,” “caffeine is C2H10N4O2,” or “gold is Au,” 
they are referring to structural elements within particular natural kinds. 
They are referring hermeneutically to what they experience in the lab.
Causal relations are generally understood as localized or lateralized. 
For example, information-processing for perceptions and emotions are 
localized in the brain. Seeing, hearing, sensing, movement, linguistic 
understanding, and aphasia are exemplifications of the relevant 
properties of different parts of a human brain. And yet these different 
parts of the brain share information with each other, exhibiting the 
inter-relationality of parts of the whole and facilitating a re-invigoration 
of perception at another level.28) The notion of brain localization may be 
applicable to the case of state information as well. We can regard the 
world as the totality of state informations and take various states not only 
as localized but also as inter-relational. States form systems of various 
kinds and levels, showing manifestations of dispositions as well as the 
silencing of dispositions. States as dispositions can be analyzed in terms 
of the dispositional property of causality.29) Causes are merely 
dispositions toward particular results and they do not necessitate any 
particular results simply because those causes may be constrained by 
28) According to Jungoh Kim (2011), the notion of information localization seems to 
have helped Fodor (1983) and Robbins (2009) advance the concept of informational 
encapsulation, but this concept fails to explain the connections among information 
encapsulations at the next stage because of its dissociative character.
29) Mumford & Anjum (2011, 2010); Marmodoro (2010).
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other forces. Such forces behave additionally or deductively just as 
vectors have sizes and directions. Such a model helps to draw a picture 
of the relations between things such as causal modality, the 
manifestations of power, a power’s withdrawal causality, and causal 
probability. This picture can be understood as nothing other than an 
informational structure in which the manifestation forces as well as the 
withdrawal forces of parts of a state are both localized. The efficacy of 
causality is the power of a property of a thing.30) Properties are given, 
natural or physical, and yet they are also dispositional, intentional, and 
information-processing. The essentiality of properties is manifested when 
properties reveal themselves as subjects that refer to each other in their 
causal relations. Speakers utter “this” to refer derivatively to what those 
natural subjects refer to originally. 
The second type of natural reference is based on an analysis of the 
essentiality of a property. Some reference seems to be mutual reference 
among essential properties in states of nature; in other words, essential 
properties do exist. The argument for this claim consists of the following 
three hypotheses: (i) fitting31) pairs in a causal relation are connected 
essentially; (ii) essential properties of a thing are primitively modal; and 
(iii) the rejection of essential properties implies that true counterfactuals 
cannot be entertained. What then are essential properties? One may 
answer this question in Kripkean manner.32) Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela 
30) As John Heil (2003) claims, properties or qualities are all objects of perceptions, 
they cannot be objects of perception without power, and the individuation of 
properties cannot be separated from the individuation of manifestations of 
properties. Thus, the powers of properties become dispositions of properties. As 
Heil thinks that all properties are dispositions, we may be reminded of the way he 
argues: properties are all objects of perceptions; they cannot be objects of perception 
without power; the individuation of properties cannot be separated from the 
individuation of manifestations of properties; the powers of properties become 
dispositions of properties; therefore all properties are dispositions.
31) Chung, D.(1997; 2008b).
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was a South African anti-apartheid politician, who served as President of 
South Africa from 1994 to 1999. This is true, but contingently true. The 
property expressed by “being President of South Africa” was a 
contingent property of N. R. Mandela, since he might not have been 
President of South Africa. Born on July 18, 1918, N. R. Mandela was the 
son of Nkosi Mphakanyiswa Gadla Mandela and Nonqaphi Nosekeni. If 
this is true then it is necessarily true. The property of being the son of N. 
M. G. Mandela and N. Nosekeni is an essential property of N. R. 
Mandela. For the zygote cell that developed at time ti from a sperm of N. 
M. G. Mandela and an ovum of N. Nosekeni could not become anything 
other than N. R. Mandela. Once an essential property is understood in 
such a way, it is easy to see that natural reference is not a notion 
constructed within an arbitrary language; rather, it is something reached 
through the interpretation of the structure of an essential property.
This can be illustrated by means of an example that shows how fitting 
pairs in a causal relation are connected essentially. Consider this 
sentence: “Ice cubes in a glass cool water and water in the glass melts ice 
cubes.” The properties referred to by “the cooling of water by ice cubes” 
and “the melting of ice cubes by water” execute causal powers to each 
other and construct simultaneous and mutual causal relations.33) The two 
32) Kripke, S. (1977a: 16-17, 113-114; 1977b); Chung, D. (1988).
33) Martin (2008: 175-185); Molnar (2003: 187-196). Some may disagree with my 
interpretation of Kripkean property essentialism here. Chen Bo (2011) does not 
accept the idea of a posteriori necessity; instead he claims that proper names or rigid 
designators are forms of descriptions. Lee & Yi (2016) argue that origin 
essentialism implies that there are individually possible but jointly impossible 
organisms and material objects, whereas the essentialist arguments rest on the 
assumption that, contra to origin essentialism, any two possible things of the kind in 
question are compossible. Sungil Han (2016) proposes that Kripke’s negative thesis 
of origin essentialism―the claim that objects necessarily have their origin in no 
alternative source to the actual one―fails to constitute the positive thesis of origin 
essentialism that objects necessarily have their origin in some pertinent source. But 
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properties above each have their own individual dispositions; they 
become a causally fitting pair under relevant conditions and engage in 
causal manifestations. The two properties become essential for the 
manifestation of their causal relations. They become fitting pairs, fitting 
only to each other, among all the properties in the world. They refer to 
each other in their essential relation through the processing of 
informations, and a human observer derivatively can recognize their 
original mutual references and interpret them. 
How is it possible that two properties in the relation of a fitting pair 
refer to each other? According to one dispositionalist analysis,34) the 
properties referred to by “the cooling of water by ice cubes” and “the 
melting of ice cubes by water” are dispositions toward manifestations of 
such results under appropriate circumstances, having the function of 
selecting a fitting partner among many available properties. Properties 
are disposed to direct themselves toward fitting partners, to look for 
them, and to favor them. Causal powers and the dispositions of these 
properties cannot be analyzed in any other way, it seems. The causal 
powers of the essential properties of a thing are primitively modal.
In this article I have tried to defend the position of realism by arguing 
that “this” can be an inter-agentic referential term. The indexical can be 
used to connect the different experiences of two speakers; two token 
utterances of “this” can point to the same thing even though the two 
the structure of my interpretation is such that if N. R. Mandela actually originated 
from the zygote formed at ti from the sperm of N. M. G. Mandela s and the ovum of 
N. Nosekeni then it is necessary that N. R. Mandela originated from that zygote. I 
would not reject the notion of compossibility, for an example, that it is actual that N. 
R. Mandela was the son of N. M. G. Mandela and N. Nosekeni, and yet it is 
compossible that N. R. Mandela was the son of non-N. M. G. Mandela and N. 
Nosekeni. But this compossibility is allowed when we take Putnam’s “same L” 
relation as de dicto. (note my discussion above about two theories of meaning of the 
word “water”).
34) Mumford & Anjum (2011: 189-190). 
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speakers express different contents with those utterances. The 
demonstrative “this” may also be used in two different theories to refer to 
the same thing with which the theories are concerned. Even though “this” 
tends to be understood in ordinary language mostly as an intra-agentic 
term, I tried to identify a space in which an inter-agentic use takes place. 
I have also argued that the natural world of causal dispositions consists 
of natural agents that are information processors. If these natural agents 
find fitting partners and come to have mutual causal relations, they can 
refer to each other in their original state. We human beings interpret 
those original referential relations derivatively by using indexicals.35) 
Submitted: 2017. 02. 28
Reviewed: 2017. 07. 09 
Confirmed for Publication: 2017. 07. 10
35) Acknowledgment: This paper was read at The 3rd CCPEA (Conference on 
Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia, August 19-20, 2016, Seoul National 
University). I thank all the participants of the conference for their helpful 
discussions. I am especially grateful to Professors John McGuire, Inrae Cho, Jung 
Won Lee, Jinho Kang, Hwan Sunwoo, Sun-Hie Kim, and 3 anonymous reviewers 
for their criticisms, stimuluses or helps to improve the paper.
Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 29
References
Babb, M. (2016), “The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (264): 439-457.
Bo, Chen (2011), “Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A 
Posteori,” History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
Bacon, J. et al. eds. (2008), Ontology, Causality, and Mind, Cambridge 
University Press.
Braun, David (2015), “Indexicals”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(on line), ed. E. N. Zalta. 
Braun, David (2008), “Complex Demonstratives and Their Singular 
Contents,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 31: 57-99.
Cheng, Kai-Yuan (2008), “The Significance of Indeterminacy: Semantic 
Eliminativism or Dispositional Reductionism?”, Philosophy and 
Culture 35 (8): 47-65.
Chung, Daihyun (2013), This Spoken of Thus-Pluralistic Realism (in 
Korean), Seoul: Sechang Publishing. 
Chung, Daihyun (1997), Philosophy of Fitting: Toward Meaning and 
Truth (in Korean), Seoul: Cholhakgwahyunsilsa. 
Chung, D. (2016a), “Integrationality(誠): A Metaphysical Basis for the 
Concept of Causation” (CCPEA 2012 Teipei), The Korean Society 
of Analytic Philosophy, ed., Philosophical Analysis, 17(1): 1-20. 
Chung, D. (2016b), “Can Reference Be Naturalized?- Notes toward an 
Integrational(誠) Causality” (CCPEA 2014 Kyoto), Philosophy 
Study 6 (5): 289-304. 
Chung, D. (2014), “Dispositions: An Integrational(誠) Analysis” 
(Gyunghee Disposition Workshop 2012), Diogène, 248: 59-70.
Chung, D. (2008a), “Intentionality of Cheng (誠): Toward an Organic 
View,” Korean Philosophical Association, ed., Philosophy and 
Daihyun Chung30
Culture: Metaphysics, 2008: 33-40.
Chung, D. (2008b), “Fitting: A Case of Cheng(誠) Intentionality”, 
Abstracts: XXII World Congress of Philosophy: 109.
Chung, D. (2008c), “Seeds: Agents of Cheng(誠) Intentionality”, 
Abstracts: XXII World Congress of Philosophy: 110. 
Chung, D. (1988), “Kripkean Essentialism and Natural Kinds” (in 
Korean), Korean Philosophical Association, ed., Philosophy, 
29(Spring 1988): 129 -145.
Choi, Lee-Sun (2008), “Essence and Identity”, Proceedings of the Xxii 
World Congress of Philosophy 15:29-36. < https://philpapers.org/s/
Lee-Sun%20Choi >.
Davidson, D. (1990), “The Structure and Content of Truth,” Journal of 
Philosophy, June, 1990: 279-328.
Davidson, D. (1984), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 
University Press, 1984.
Dorato, M. and Morganti, M. (2013). “Grades of Individuality: A 
Pluralistic View of Identity in Quantum Mechanics and in the 
Sciences”. Philosophical Studies 163: 591-610.
French, P. A. et al. eds. (1979), Contemporary Perspectives in the 
Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Goodman, N. (1978), Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Han, Sungil (2016), “The Limit of the Kripkean Defence of Origin 
Essentialism,” The Spring Proceedings of the Korean Society of 
Analytic Philosophy. 
Harnad, Stevan (2005). “To Cognize is to Categorize”, in Lefebvre, C. 
and Cohen, H., Eds. Handbook of Categorization. Elsevier.
Heil, John (2010), “Powerful Qualities”, in Marmodoro (2010): 58-71.
Heil, John (2003), From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford University 
Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 31
Press.
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1977), “Procedural Semantics”, Cognition, 5: 
189-214.
Kang, Jinho (2013), “Co-referentiality and Theory Realism” (in Korean), 
in Chung (2013): 272-274. 
Kant, I. (1781/1787), Critique of Pure Reason, tr. P. Guyer, et al. 
Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Kaplan, D. (1985, 1978), “Dthat,” In Martinich, A. P. ed., (1985).
Kaplan, D. (1979, 1978), “On the Logic of Demonstratives,” in French, P. 
A. et al. eds., 1979: 401-412.
Kaplan, D. (1971, 1968), “Quantifying in”, in Linsky, L. ed. (1971): 
120-144. 
Kim, Jaegwon (1996), Philosophy of Mind, Westview.
Kim, Jaegwon (1977), “Perception and Reference without Causality,” 
Journal of Philosophy, 1977: 606-620.
Kim, Jungoh (2011), Study of Minds (in Korean), Sigmapress.
Kim, Sun-Hie (2013), “Co-referentiality and Theory Realism” (in 
Korean), In Chung (2013): 276-278. 
Kripke, S. (1977a, 1972), Naming and Necessity, Harvard University 
Press. 
Kripke, S. (1977b, 1971), “Identity and Necessity”, Naming, Necessity 
and Natural Kinds, in Schwartz, S. P. ed. 1977: 66-101.
Kvart, I. (1982), “Quine and Modalities de re: A Way Out?” Journal of 
Philosophy, June 1982: 295-328.
Lee, Chunghyoung & Byeong-uk Yi (2016), “Impossible Objects and 
Origin Essentialism,” The Spring Proceedings of the Korean 
Society of Analytic Philosophy, 2016. 
Lee, Jeongmin (2017), “Learning Chinese Room”, AI after Alphago, 
Korean Society for Philosophy of Science Proceedings, July 5-6, 
Daihyun Chung32
2017: 179-194.
Lee, Jung Won (2009), “A New Approach to the Measurement and 
Schroedinger’ Cat Paradox: Supports from Stern-Gerlach 
Experiment” (in Korean), Korean Society for Philosophy of 
Science, ed., Philosophy of Science, 12(1): 1-23. 
Lee, Jung Won (2002), “A Critical Defense of Internal Realism” (in 
Korean), Korean Society of Philosophical Studies, ed., Philosophical 
Studies, 58: 279-303.
Linsky, L. ed. (1971), Reference and Modality, Oxford University Press, 
1971.
Mackie, J. L. (1975), “Causes and Conditions”, Causation and Conditionals, 
ed. Ernest Sosa. Oxford University Press.
Marmodoro, A., ed. (2010), The Metaphysics of Powers, Routledge.
Marmodoro, A. (2010), “Introduction”, in Marmodoro (2010): 1-7. 
Martin, C. B. (2008), “Power for Realists”, in Bacon, J. et al. eds. (2008: 
175-185).
Martinich, A. P. ed., (1985), The Philosophy of Language, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Molnar, G. (2003), Powers-A Study in Metaphysics, Oxford University 
Press. 
Mumford, S. & Anjum, R. K. (2011), Getting Causes from Powers, 
Oxford University Press. 
Mumford, S. & Anjum, R. K. (2010), “A Powerful Theory of Causation”, 
in Marmodoro (2010): 143-157.
Perry, J. (1979), “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, Nous, 24 (5): 
723-734.
Putnam, H. (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Harvard University 
Press.
Putnam, H. (1988), Representation and Reality, MIT Press.
Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 33
Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University 
Press.
Putnam, H. (1980), “Models and Reality” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 
45-3(Sept. 1980): 464-482.
Putnam, H. (1978b), “Reference and Understanding”, in Putnam, H. 
(1978a): 97-119.
Putnam, H. (1978a), Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Boston: RKP.
Putnam, H. (1977), “Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and 
Quine”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, IV: 423-442. 
Putnam, H. (1973), “Meaning and Reference”, in Schwartz, S. P. ed. 
(1977): 119-132. 
Putnam, H. (1970), “Is Semantics Possible?” in Schwartz, S. P. ed. 
(1977): 102-118. 
Quine, W. (1956), “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, in Linsky, 
L. ed. (1971): 101-111.
Quine, W. (1960), Word and Object, Wiley.
Schaffer, J. (2004), “From Contextualism to Constrastivism”, Philosophical 
Studies, 119 (May 2004): 73-103.
Schwartz, S. P. ed. (1977), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Son, Byung-Hong (2003), “Haecceitic Modal Acutalim” (in Korean), 
Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy, ed., Philosophical 
Analysis, 17: 61-82.
Stalnaker, R. (1984), Inquiry, MIT Press.
Sunwoo, Hwan (2013), “Co-referentiality and Theory Realism” (in 
Korean), in Chung (2013): 281-287. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
